In the matter of:

STATE OF WASHINGON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KURT R. RIGGIN,

Defendant.

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No. 02-G020467CC

Judge Fitterer:

Case 02-G020467CC.

PA Chen:

Your Honor, if I could start when, in the general, in the motion made by Mr. De Young, which was received last week.

Judge:

Uh hum

Chen:

The, ah, I believed at the time you had stricken the motion. Your Honor has told me that the motion was not stricken and that it was possible for Mr. De Young to, um to readdress on Friday. In the motion there is a general denial. The State is prepared with, um, witnesses to argue the general denial, but, would request the court make a decision at this point, um, that is in the matter really for the Jury to be and it would save the witnesses some time.

Brent De Young:

Can I respond?

Judge:

Go ahead.

Brent:

Your Honor, um, I think this is what a Knapstad Motion is, and you know courts regularly hear Knapstad Motions.

Judge:

Um.

Brent:

Um, I see no reason why we can’t hear it. Therefore, if we’re not going to hear it, it goes back to my earlier argument that without hearing the argument, I’m completely unprepared to represent Mr. Riggin.

Judge:

Um, Well what we did is we heard Mr. Riggin’s motions and earlier and we set up Friday, again, and unfortunately, I wasn’t able to get here in time, um, to hear Mr. De Young’s motions. We’ll go ahead and hear those today, um, and the parties can proceed as they see appropriate.

De Young:

One preliminary matter, Your Honor. It’s, ah, I had a witness under subpoena yesterday. It’s a person from the Post Office here, the Post Master, and, uh, he left last time we were in court because he couldn’t stay any longer, for no purpose, and, I’ve endeavored to get him back here this morning, but, I’ve, we’ve been unable to contact him. He was on our witness list so I don’t know if he’s going to call. I left instructions in my office to reach me by cell phone if they’re able to get a hold of him, but he is on our witness list and uh, we’ll just take it as it goes, Your Honor.

Judge:

OK, and what I might have you do is make an offer of proof as to what he would have to say, and we’ll determine whether or not we need him.

De Young:

OK.

Judge:

Go ahead.

De Young:

Your Honor, this is a Knapstad Motion so I think it would be appropriate for the State at this time to put on any evidence that refutes, or that basically proves their case. Uh, I could go through the motion, the first that starts with the Bill of Particulars, Um, Miss Chen has uh, refined that a little bit, it – before it quoted the whole statute and I think it was two hearings ago, perhaps three and ee were told that it would just apply to the first provision that he held himself out as a non-lawyer who practiced law, or holds himself, or is entitled to practice law. Um, anyway, Your Honor. This is all argument. Perhaps it would be better if we’d save the argument until we take some testimony.

Judge:

That’s fine.

Chen:

The State calls it’s first witness. Prosecutor Teddy Chow.

Judge:

Please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give is the truth under penalty of perjury.

Chow:

I do.

Judge:

Please be seated, get comfortable, pull the microphone up, state your full name and business address.

Chow:

Teddy Chow. P. O. Box 37, C Street, Ephrata.

Chen:

Mr. Chow. Do you know Kurt Riggin?

Chow:

I do.

Chen:

Can you identify his appearance?

Chow:

He’s the person with the long hair sitting next to Mr. Brent De Young.

Chen:

Your Honor, for the record the State will indicate that Mr. Chow has identified the defendant (inaudible) . . .

De Young:

Stipulated.

Judge:

Yeah.

Chen:

Mr. Chow, do you know how did you first come to know Mr. Riggin?

Chow:

As I recall, it was sometime last year when uh, Mr. Riggin made a call to my office asking to talk to me uh, about another client. I think his last name was Roe?

Chen:

So, Mr. Riggin first came to you. And what was the content of that conversation?

Chow:

He wanted to know why bail was set at a cash amount and he demanded that his client be let out.

Chen:

So, Mr. Riggin identified himself to you as having Mr. Roe as his client?

Chow:

Right.

Chen:

Did he identify himself by name?

Chow:

Um, I think so. There were two individuals. There was Luis Ewing, as well as Mr. Riggin.

Chen:

And they both approached you on that day?

Chow:

Um,..for several days.

Chen:

And did Mr. Riggin...? (Interrupted)

De Young:

Excuse me. What was the answer to that? For several days? Is it including that day or not?

Chow:

I don’t even now exactly what day we’re talking about, but it wasn’t a single contact. It was multiple contacts.

De Young:

Ok. So the answer was, uh, “You can’t testify to that particular day.” Is that correct? (Pause) That both of them telephoned you.

Chow:

Both of them telephoned.

De Young:

They did. Right. Both on that day.

De Young:

Ok, Thank you.

Chen:

Did Mr. Riggin identify himself as an attorney to you?

Chow:

Pardon?

Chen:

Did Mr. Riggin identify himself as an attorney?

Chow:

I don’t believe in the phone call. I think, uh, after subsequent contacts. And then it was the tone of the conversation that made me concerned that maybe he wasn’t an attorney, or was not an attorney. So I looked him up on the Bar web site and didn’t find his name. And as I recall, I think, at that point, or at some point, he had said that he was an Indian . . . or he was a, uh, tribal attorney.

Judge:

What...What’s a . . ?

Chen:

Would it refresh your memory, Mr. Chow, to see a transcribed (inaudible.)

Chow:

Sure.

Chen:

(Inaudible) . . . transcript . . . (inaudible)

De Young:

I’m going to object at this time for foundation, and we’ll see if foundation is established.

Chen:

(Inaudible)

Chow:

(Sigh)

Chen:

Mr. Chow, do you recognize this document?

Chow:

I do.

Chow:

What is it?

Chow:

It appears to be the transcript of my voice mail message.

Chen:

And how is it that you are able to recognize it?

Chow:

I remember reporting this to the deputies.

Chen:

Was this a true and accurate transcription of that message?

Chow:

I don’t know. It’s been too long.

Chen:

Sorry?

Chow:

I don’t know. It’s been too long. I’m sure there’s an audio tape of it someplace.

De Young:

We have not been provided that audio tape.

Chen:

Would you like a moment to review the message?

Chow:

Um . .

I’ve read it.

Chen:

Does it appear to you to be a true and accurate transcription of what you recall?

Chow:

Yeah.

Chen:

In this message does Mr. Riggin identify himself?

Chow:

He does.

Chen:

And this is a message to who?

Chow:

I believe this is on, uh, either my . . . my secretary’s voice mail or my voice mail.

Chen:

Does Mr. Riggin leave a phone number?

Chow:

Uh, I believe he does.

Chen:

And what is the area for that phone number?

Chow:

206

Chen:

To the best of your knowledge, what is area code 206?

Chow:

Seattle metropolitan.

Chen:

(Inaudible) What is your recollection of the jist of this message?

Chow:

The jist of the message is that he wanted Mr. Roe to be released and that there are violations of some criminal rule of some sort . . um. . . that they were objectionable . . . um . . .appealable . . . and otherwise to me makes no sense. Most attorneys never bring these things up and that’s why my suspicion was aroused that perhaps this individual was not an attorney.

Chen:

Was it your impression from the message and from your previous contact with Mr. Riggin that he was holding himself out to be a lawyer?

Chow:

As I recall, my secretary informed me that he had given a federal bar number, and I don’t remember what the number was, but, I think I tried looking into it and couldn’t find it.

Chen:

So, was it your impression that he was holding himself out to be an attorney?

Chow:

Yes.

Chen:

Mr. Chow, you say you investigated into whether or not Mr. Riggin was an attorney, is that correct?

Chow:

That’s correct.

Chen:

Did you call . . . did you call or view the site of the WSBA?

Chow:

I did. I checked on the . . .ah . . .web site, and knowing that web sites are not always correct, I called the Bar Association to double check with their hard copy records. As I recall, they stated that no such person was an attorney.

Chen:

Mr. Chow, I just handed to you, um, correspondence, an affidavit from a Mr. Robert Weldon, General Counsel for the Washington State Bar Association.

Chow:

Right. That’s what it looks like.

Chen:

Did you speak . . . You said you spoke with someone at the Washington State Bar Association.

Chow:

I did, but I don’t remember who.

Chen:

And is this information consistent with what you received?

Chow:

It is consistent.

Chen:

Your Honor, this is a . . .This is a document prepared by the General Counsel of the Washington State Bar Association. It states that . . . that (inaudible):

“I am General Counsel of the Washington State Bar Association. I make all statements here from my own personal knowledge. As custodian of the records of the Washington State Bar Association would be prompted to testify as the same if was called as a witness. In order to be authorized to appear as an attorney or counselor in the Courts of the State of Washington, and to practice law in the State, the person must be admitted to practice law by the Washington Supreme Court and be an active member of the Washington State Bar Association. Citation given. The records of the Washington State Bar Association disclose that no person named Kurt Riggin has ever been admitted to practice in the State of Washington.”

Your Honor, this is a self-authenticated document, certified and admissible pursuant to ER1005 as a business record and I would move to admit it as State’s Plaintiff Exhibit “A.”

De Young:

I have no objections. We’ve never stated that he was a member of the State Bar.

Judge:

The . . . ah . . . it needs to be marked as Exhibit . . .

Chen:

(Inaudible)

Judge:

It is already marked? And you said you have no objections?

Chen:

No, he has never contended he was a Washington State attorney, only a tribal attorney, which is a separate sovereign.

Judge:

All right. E B is admitted without objection.

Chen:

Mr. Chow, did you research the North West Indian Bar Association?

Chow:

I searched for Mr. Riggin’s name and I believe his name popped up on one of those registries for the Indian Bar Association.

Chen:

And did you ascertain what the requirements were for membership?

Chow:

I did not. I did not because I didn’t feel it was relevant. If he is not part of the Washington State Bar Association, it didn’t matter.

Chen:

Your Honor, the State would ask the Court to take judicial notice of the NIBA web site provided for, for your information. It states that membership is available to native attorneys, judges, spokespersons, employees of the court, law school graduates, or current law school students, or non-native attorneys, judges, law school graduates or law school students, in service tribal judges who are engaged in primarily the study of Indian law, and includes those spokespersons and employees. That is people who have not been attorneys. And I can provide that to the Court.

De Young:

We’ll stipulate to this, Your Honor. The tribes are a separate sovereign. If they want to, ah, hire Ronald MacDonald to be their judge, or ah, their attorneys, they can do that.

Judge:

E - C is admitted.

Chen:

Mr. Chow, do you have anything, um, any other contact with Mr. Riggin in which he may have mentioned he was an attorney, or held himself out as an attorney, since that last phone call?

Chow:

I believe he showed up in Grant County at some point. But, I don’t exactly remember the entire conversation either. I tried not to pay attention to Mr. Riggin. He was pestering me, and my staff.

De Young:

Motion to strike. Not responsive.

Judge:

It was not responsive

Chen:

Mr. Chow, you say you investigated the complaint. Does that include speaking with other people in the offices?

Chow:

In our office? At the prosecutor’s office?

Chen:

Speaking with other people who may have had contact with Mr. Riggin?

De Young:

Sounds like hearsay, Your Honor.

Chow:

I did.

Chen:

You did?

Chow:

I did.

Chen:

And did that inform your investigation?

Chow:

Did that what now?

Chen:

And did that inform your investigation? Was that significant to your investigation, those conversations?

Chow:

Yes.

De Young:

No foundation, Your Honor.

Chen:

Who did you speak with . . .

Judge:

He can say that he had communication, he just can’t say what they were.

Chen:

And whom did you speak with?

Chow:

Court clerks, um, other members of my staff who had contact via phone with Mr. Riggin, or personal contact at the, ah, window of the prosecutor’s office.

Chen:

Did you speak with the public defenders?

Chow:

Um, yeah, I did, actually.

Chen:

What . . .

Chow:

The public defenders were assigned to Mr. Roe’s case and I believe they got phone calls from Mr. Riggin as well, um. . .

De Young:

Your Honor, this is a belief.

Chow:

As I recall, there was conversation with the public defender’s office, with Mr. Riggin.

Judge:

That’s okay. As he recalls. He doesn’t know.

De Young:

Your Honor, I don’t know what the substance of this is. This looks like it might go under Sixth Amendment protected communications. I don’t know if Mr. Chow was listening in on them, or if he was a part of them, and, anyway, we need those witnesses here. If it’s not Sixth Amendment Protected Communication.

Judge:

Well, if it’s going to go anywhere, I don’t know.

Chen:

That’s the end of my questioning of Mr. Chow.

Judge:

Cross examination.

De Young:

Yes, Your Honor.

Okay, Mr. Chow, how long have you been with the prosecuting attorney’s office here?

Chow:

Almost two years.

De Young:

Okay, and uh, how is the office set up, uh, telephone-wise? Do you have your own telephone line?

Chow:

I have my own telephone line. I also have my secretary’s telephone line.

De Young:

Okay. And the first, uh, phone call, uh, which, uh, you heard Mr. Riggin speak, when was that? When did that take place?

Chow:

I would have to find out when Mr. Roe was brought to the uh, when his case was about to be heard. Sometime around then.

De Young:

Do you have any personal knowledge when that might be?

Chow:

If I could remember the exact date of every person who came to court, I wouldn’t be here.

De Young:

You’d be counting cards in Las Vegas, I assume.

Chow:

That’s right!

De Young:

Mr. Chow, can you roughly estimate what month, and if you can’t do that, what time of year?

Chow:

I can’t even do that. It’s been too long. We’ve been looking for Mr. Riggin for a little too long, so I can’t remember.

De Young:

You say you were looking for Mr. Riggin? Why were you looking for Mr. Riggin?

Chow:

Because Mr. Riggin does not have a valid address that we are aware of.

De Young:

Okay. You were aware that he did not have a valid address?

Chow:

His DOL page showed Ballard as an address, and I know Ballard isn’t a valid address.

De Young:

Are you aware of the procedure in the prosecuting attorney’s office, how, uh, motions to appear for arraignment and summons are handled?

Chow:

Somewhat.

De Young:

To the best of your knowledge, how it works, uh, how would that work when somebody’s charged by information or criminal complaint and uh, how would they be told to appear?

Chow:

I believe they would find their DOL address and send it to their last known, and that would be the last known address.

De Young:

If you could back up a little bit more, I just would like to have more of the procedure on the record. What’s it involve when a prosecuting attorney in the State of Washington, which we have the unique right here to do this in this state, to charge a person with a crime.

Chow:

I don’t understand.

De Young:

How, how do you charge somebody with a crime as a prosecutor?

Chow:

Well, you were there once. Um.

De Young:

Unfortunately, I cannot testify for the record, Mr. Chow.

Chow:

Well, why don’t you leave me alone? It is cross examination. I’m afraid I don’t know exactly what you’re asking.

De Young:

okay. Um, how would you, um, first receive something that you would issue your own criminal complaint on?

Chow:

I don’t issue the criminal complaint.

De Young:

I just said “if” you would do that, I’m not speaking specifically, how would that information first come to you?

Chow:

I would get a police report.

De Young:

okay, and then what would you do?

Chow:

I would read through it.

De Young:

Okay. And if you felt a crime had committed, what would you do?

Chow:

I would have my secretary charge it.

De Young:

Okay, and do you then sign off on those charges?

Chow:

I do.

De Young:

Again, we’re not referring to this specific complaint of Mr. Riggin’s. I’ll make that clear because you have also made it clear. Then what happens after you sign that criminal complaint?

Chow:

I think we send it to the court

De Young:

Okay. For what purpose?

Chow:

For them to send the summons.

De Young:

Okay, and do you know . . . are you aware where the address of a particular defendant would come from?

Chow:

Typically it is the Department of License is what we use.

De Young:

Okay, “We” Does that mean the prosecuting attorney supplies that?

Chow:

Correct.

De Young:

okay, and you already testified that you were aware that , uh, wasn’t a valid address when you charged him. Is that correct?

Chow:

It appears fictitious.

De Young:

Okay. What steps did you take in your research to determine whether it was fictitious or not?

Chow:

Well, we looked at his driver’s license. He hasn’t had one since, I think sometime in the Eighties.

De Young:

Okay. Is a person compelled in the State of Washington to keep a driver’s license, Mr. Chow?

Chow:

If I’m not mistaken, he’s required to update his address so we can locate him.

De Young:

Okay. What’s your source of that belief, Mr. Chow?

Chow:

I think there’s a statute that says you need to update with the Department of Licensing your address.

De Young:

If a person doesn’t have a driver’s license, Mr. Chow?

Chow:

Or your identification . . .

De Young:

okay. Are you aware that Mr., uh, Riggin, has an identification card?

Chow:

From?

De Young:

From any, uh, source whatsoever?

Chow:

Not that I’m aware of.

De Young:

Okay. So the only information that you have is that he had a valid driver’s license sometime back in the Eighties. Is that correct?

Chow:

Correct.

De Young:

okay, Um. I’ll ask the question again. Do you know of any particular statute which compels a person to drive an automobile in the State of Washington?

Chow:

Driving is a privilege, it’s not a right. It’s not something you are compelled to do.

De Young:

Okay. So the answer is, then, a person is not compelled to drive a motor vehicle in the . . .

Chow:

Correct.

De Young:

in the State of Washington. Okay.

Mr. Chow, this, uh, tape recording which has been summarized which refreshed your memory by referring uh, to the tape recording...it looks like it appear to have been taken March 18, 2002, uh, from Linda Holden’s voice mail. Was that the date of the call or was that the date that it was recorded, do you know?

Chow:

Hmmm... I don’t recall. You’d have to ask Deputy Key.

De Young:

Okay... Mr. Chow, you said you don’t have any personal knowledge when the tape recording was affected. Is that correct?

Chow:

Correct.

De Young:

Okay.

Chow:

I remember it being taken. I don’t remember what day or when it was done. This was over a year ago.

De Young:

Very good. Your conversations with Mr. Riggin, were they in person or were they by telephone?

Chow:

I think it was by telephone. I don’t remember contacting Mr. Riggin ‘til this year, I think.

De Young:

Okay. Let’s refine that one step further then. Do you recall whether it was by messages left on your’s or your secretary’s answering machine, or whether he actually reached you in person?

Chow:

I believe at some point he reached me in person. I think he was irritating my secretary enough where I had to deal with this.

De Young:

Do you recall when that was? When . . . when you finally spoke with him.

Chow:

I don’t.

De Young:

Okay. Uh, do you recall whether it was before or after, uh, this conversation?

Chow:

I don’t remember that either.

De Young:

Okay. Mr. Chow? Have you ever received telephone calls on your answering machine from people who were not lawyers, uh, inquiring about cases?

Chow:

Usually they are from parents, kids.

De Young:

okay. Um. . . are those usually on your secretary’s, uh, telephone messaging sysem, or yours?

Chow:

Perhaps they are on my secretary’s, if they were my secretary’s. She usually doesn’t tell me, because I don’t deal with them.

De Young:

Fair enough. Uh, but you have . . you are aware of some phone calls of that nature, is that correct?

Chow:

Every once in a while the switchboard will dump one into my e, my voice mail.

De Young:

Is it also correct sometimes you’re sitting around with nothing to do and if the secretary’s phone . .phone rings, you might answer it?

Chow:

That’s also a possibility.

De Young:

And how do you handle those, uh, family members who, are definitely not attorneys and asking information about cases.

Chow:

Tell them they need to talk to an attorney.

De Young:

Okay. Do you know is there any policy, uh, regarding non-attorney phone calls in the prosecuting attorney’s office?

Chow:

Generally speaking, they don’t get through to me.

De Young:

Okay, uh, what I was asking was are you aware of a policy that you were informed of regarding non-attorney phone calls in the prosecuting attorney’s office?

Chow:

I don’t recall.

De Young:

Okay. Do you recall receiving a written notification about this point?

Chow:

I’m sure there’s something in there someplace. I don’t know. I don’t remember.

De Young:

Okay. You ever receive phone calls, uh, from attorneys who are out of state?

Chow:

Yes.

De Young:

Okay. And how do you handle those?

Chow:

Tell them they need to find a local attorney, or somebody who can practice in the state of Washington.

De Young:

And, again, are you aware of any particular policy in the prosecutor’s office that compels you to do that?

Chow:

Not that I can recall.

De Young:

Okay. Is it possible that an out-of-state attorney could be representing a person on a matter where the resolution of the matter over here might affect the out-of-state matter?

Chow:

I’m sorry?

Chen:

I going to object on grounds . . (inaudible) . . that I believe there is a claim that Mr. Riggin is from out-of-state . . (inaudible).

Judge:

Well, I think, uh, the argument’s going to be that it’s an analogy.

De Young:

Correct.

Judge:

I’ll go ahead and allow the line of questioning. Go ahead.

De Young:

Okay, let’s have a hypothetical, Mr. Chow. A person from Oregon is represented a client from over here in Oregon on a DUI. The client re-offends over here afterwards, gets another DUI. Um.... do you think it would be relevant, uh, for the Oregon attorney to receive information about the case here? To know how it would affect the Oregon matter?

Chow:

I don’t understand your question.

De Young:

Okay. What part of it don’t you understand, so I can break it down just in that part?

Chow:

Well, you’re asking me . . . I don’t know what exactly you’re asking me.

De Young:

Okay.

Chow:

You’re asking me a hypothetical but what’s the question?

De Young:

The question is this. We’ll call him defendant “X” has received a DUI in Oregon three years ago. Oregon attorney has represented him on that. Defendant “X” this year gets a DUI over here in Grant County. Can you see any logical reason why an attorney in Oregon might be interested in the outcome of this case, another DUI in Grant County?

Chow:

I can see why they’d be interested.

De Young:

Okay. (Pause) Mr. Chow, you said, that you researched a little bit of information about Mr. Riggin, and, um, you testified that you repre.. that you investigated two areas, first you investigated, uh, the, uh, North West Indian Bar Association? Is that correct?

Chow:

No. I checked the Washington Bar Association first.

De Young:

okay. I don’t want to go over them . . . We’ll take notice that you called them first. I want to talk about the North West Indian Bar Association. Did you call them later?

Chow:

I don’t believe I ever called them.

De Young:

Okay. So you just received the information online? Or how did you receive it?

Chow:

Online.

De Young:

Okay. Did you take an Indian Law course in law school?

Chow:

Yeah.

De Young:

Okay. What is your understanding about tribal sovereignty?

Chow:

They’re not sovereign.

De Young:

What do you base that on?

Chow:

As I recall, they’re not necessarily sovereign nations . . . with the exception of one or two tribes.

De Young:

Okay.

Chow:

As I recall, they are considered dependencies or they’re, uh, ward, uh, ward and state type relationships between the United States Government. They’re wards of the State.

De Young:

Okay and that was probably... I don’t know if you’ll be able to remember this or not, but I’ll try , but that earlier case I believe was in Worcester vs. Georgia if you remember it or not. But, are you aware also of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1972?

Chow:

Unfortunately I am not as United States Attorney that deals with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, so I can’t say that I know.

De Young:

But, would it be an important factor, to you if hypothetically that Indian Tribes had been granted sovereignty, and were not independent wards of the state? Would it be important?

Chow:

Would it be important:

De Young:

Yes, in regards to your decision.

Chow:

No.

De Young:

Why not?

Chow:

Because they’re not members of the Washington Bar Association.

De Young:

Okay. Another thing you said you researched was the Federal Bar. Can you tell us what steps you took in that?

Chow:

Hmmmm... I think I did just an online search.

De Young:

Okay.

Chow:

I don’t’ remember if . I don’t remember if I called or not. Actually, I might have called the District Court someplace.

De Young:

Pardon me?

Chow:

I think I may have called the District Court someplace.

De Young:

Okay.

Chow:

I don’t recall.

De Young:

Mr. Chow, did you do any civil work at all before you joined the prosecuting attorney’s office?

Chow:

No.

De Young:

Okay. Any family law?

Chow:

No.

De Young:

You’re not aware of anything to do with the Indian Child Welfare Act in Washington?

Chow:

The Indian Child Welfare Act?

De Young:

Yes.

Chow:

ICWA?

De Young:

Yes.

Chow:

Yes.

De Young:

Okay , very good. What... what do you know about it?

Chow:

Creates a maze of things to do if the child’s Indian. That’s all I know.

De Young:

Do you under... Remember this much, maybe from your prior studies and maybe the bar test that is requires an Indian child to be placed with an Indian family and all possible choices and options?

Chow:

I don’t recall much about the ICWA.

De Young:

Okay. Do you recall a jurisdictional element of that transferred to a tribal court?

Chow:

I don’t.

De Young:

Okay. Do you know anything about a tribal court?

Chow:

A very cursory knowledge.

De Young:

What do you know? Mr. Chow, about tribal courts?

Chow:

They’re different every where you go. The tribes make up their own rules for their own people. It’s no different from a municipality in my opinion.

De Young:

Sorry, I didn’t hear.

Chow:

No, not much different from a municipality, in my opinion, you can make any rules you want.

Chow:

You believe a municipality can make any rules it wants in Washington State?

Chen:

I’m going to object to this line of questioning. It appears that he is asking legal questions which can be made an argument. Mr. Chow’s knowledge of Indian Law is irrelevant and not with the charges here. And it’s irrelevant anyway to questions. It’s a matter of law not a matter of the witness.

Judge:

Well, again I suspect it has something to do with the analogy that he made . . . to . . .

De Young:

I’m just about done, Your Honor.

Judge:

Oh. I’ll go ahead and let him finish.

De Young:

Okay. Are you aware of the title 37 in the Washington Revised Code about giving back criminal jurisdiction to Indian Tribes?

Chow:

No, because we don’t have an Indian reservation in Grant County so I don’t deal with title 37. And if I knew anything with title 37 again, I wouldn’t be working here, I would be in Vegas.

De Young:

Mr. Riggin would like me to, uh, would like me to ask one other, uh, matter, Mr. Chow. Mr. Rowe’s case. What happened to that and was it based on anything that Mr. Riggin may have said in any phone messages?

Chen:

Objection, Your Honor.

De Young:

They’re saying he is an attorney and if he’s an attorney then I wonder if they were swayed by his arguments. Mr. Chow testified that, uh, he doesn’t believe that uh, he said...

Judge:

I’m going to allow him to answer if he can.

Chow:

What was the question?

De Young:

The question was, what was the disposition of Mr. Rowe’s case and did Mr. Rowe have any bearing at all on that?

Chow:

Did he have any bearing on it?

De Young:

Well, the purpose.... Two parts. First of all, what was the disposition and second of all, did Mr. Riggin have any influence in that whatsoever?

Chow:

I have no idea what the disposition is. It is a garden variety driving suspended 3rd I recall.

De Young:

So the matter could have been dismissed.

Chow:

As far as I could tell, I don’t know.

De Young:

Okay. One other matter. So tribal courts do exist. We already covered that, right?

Chow:

I think so.

De Young:

Okay. Is it a possibility that Mr. Riggin and Mr. Roe have some type of relationship on Indian Matters. This matter of Mr. Roe’s could have had some bearing.

Chow:

I have no idea. I’m not clairvoyant.

De Young:

It’s not impossible, though is it?

Chow:

It’s possible a meteorite would strike me dead right here on the spot, too, but I don’t think likely. I don’t know.

De Young:

Okay, well it’s not a matter. The meteorite was about your opinion about it. I was just asking about whether or not it was impossible.

Chow:

That’s what I’m saying. It’s possible.

De Young:

Possible. Okay. Thank you.

Chow:

Anything is possible. (Simultaneous with above)

De Young:

Okay. You say, anything is possible. That seems to go a little bit further, if you say that absolutely anything is possible then. I’m just trying to figure out how far I could carry this idea that anything is possible. Is it possible then that Mr. Riggin had full authority to act for a tribe in the State of Washington?

Chow:

I don’t believe Grant County District Court is a tribal court.

De Young:

I didn’t ask that Mr. Chow.

Chow:

If you were a tribal attorney, I still don’t think he has authority to represent anything in Grant County District Court.

De Young:

Okay, well that begs the question whether he has represented anybody in Grant County District Court. But the question was whether he has authority as a tribal attorney.

Chow:

I have no proof that Mr. Riggin is a tribal attorney.

De Young:

Okay, but you just stated that you did some research into the North West Indian Bar online and his name came up.

Chow:

Yeah. I didn’t say anything about him being an attorney.

De Young:

Okay. So, what steps did you take to verify that was either true or not true?

Chow:

Nothing. It’s not relevant.

De Young:

No further questions.

Chen:

Mr. Chow, I’ll go through this as quicky as possible. Question has been made about whether, if an Oregon attorney for example in Oregon would call. What would the rules be for an Oregon attorney to be able to practice in this state?

Chow:

He would have to either be a Washington State bar member as well, or associate with a Washington Bar attorney.

Chen:

And you mentioned a Luis Ewing, you said . . .was calling at the same time about the same matter, correct? Randy Roe. Was he also charged with the unlawful practice of law?

Chow:

He was.

Chen:

Do you know where he is at this (inaudible)?

Chow:

Not a clue.

Chen:

Would you be surprised to know that Mr. Ewing has written a brief on this matter? (inaudible).

Chow:

Not at all.

Chen:

Thank you. (Inaudible).

Judge:

Re-cross.

De Young:

Mr. Chow, at anytime the Oregon attorney would use a hypothetical in which Ms. Chen has just questioned you on. Have you ever given information to an out-of-state attorney? Just basically what’s going on in this case?

Chow:

I may have.

De Young:

Nothing further.

Judge:

Alright. You can step down.

Chow:

Am I free to go?

Judge:

Is this witness free to go or stay?

Chen:

(Inaudible) The State would call . . .(inaudible)

Judge:

Is this witness free to go or stay?

Chen:

Mr. Chow is free to go.

Judge:

Okay. Mr. De Young?

De Young:

I’m going to reserve him for later, uh, Your Honor.

Judge:

So . . .

De Young:

We both have to be in the same place this afternoon, so we’re kind of traveling around together, so. . .

Judge:

Okay. You and he?

Yes, we’re going to Moses Lake for readiness hearings at 1:30.

Judge:

So, you’ll be in your office, if needed?

Chen:

Your honor, the State would also object to this witness on the basis of relevancy. The State has stipulated to the Postmaster’s um, information um, that we’ve already received.

Judge:

To a what?

Chen:

The State has already stipulated to the Postmaster pages. Apparently the Postmaster is here to provide foundation but there’s no reason, there’s no need.

Judge:

I’m not clear why or not. I don’t know what he’s going to testify to. So... Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you’re about to give in this matter will be the truth under penalty of perjury?

Postmaster:

I do.

Judge:

Alright. Please state your full name and address.

Postmaster:

Michael Rosenow. 119 Northwest First Avenue, Ephrata

Judge:

Get comfortable and pull that microphone up.

De Young:

Good Morning Mr. Rosenow

Postmaster:

Good Morning (simultaneous)

De Young:

Could you please spell your last name for the recording.

Postmaster:

R - O - S - E - N - O - W

De Young:

Very Good. And how are you employed?

Postmaster:

Postmaster of Ephrata

De Young:

And how long have you been employed in that position?

Postmaster:

Mmmm.. 9 years.

De Young:

Were you also with the postal system before that?

Postmaster:

Yes.

De Young:

And uh, how long have you been involved with the U.S. postal service?

Postmaster:

37 years.

De Young:

Okay. What’s the proper way to address you? Postmaster Rosenow? Mr. Rosenow? What do you prefer?

Postmaster:

Mike would be alright.

De Young:

Um, We have to keep it kind of formal for the records, um... Mr. Rosenow, were you called to review an address of Mr. Riggin’s?

Postmaster:

Yes

De Young:

Okay, and, uh, what did you notice about that address?

Postmaster:

It was addressed to Ballard, Washington with a 98107 zip code.

De Young:

Okay, is Ballard, uh, a proper way to note an address in Washington?

Postmaster:

It can be if the zip code is correct.

De Young:

Okay. Was the zip code correct in this instance?

Postmaster:

Yes.

De Young:

Okay. Were there any other uh, potential problems with the address?

Postmaster:

I noticed that, uh, part of the address was missing. “street” was missing because it was addressed to something, northwest 51st

De Young:

Very good. Another uh, question. Uh, was there any chance, you knowing the postal system for 37 years, and being familiar of it, that this letter might be kicked back as undeliverable?

Postmaster:

Oh, it’s possible.

De Young:

Okay. Why...What would that be based on.

Postmaster:

Well, if it was an inexperienced carrier on the route that day, that didn’t recognize that it should be 51st street, for example. The address would have been incomplete and it could have been returned as insufficient address. Perhaps they didn’t know the person’s name that lived there. Could be, “Unknown at This Address.”

De Young:

Ok. The Ballard part, would that be another reason or not?

Postmaster:

Ballard what?

De Young:

The Ballard notation. Would that potentially be another reason?

Postmaster:

Well, that’s kind of a stretch sir. Because Ballard is serviced by Seattle, and there are many delivery stations in Seattle and the mail is sorted by zip code primarily.

De Young:

Okay. Okay, no further questions.

Postmaster:

Thank you.

Judge:

Any cross examination?

Chen:

Just a little. Just to clarify. Um, Mr. Rosenow, you said undeliverable might mean that it arrived, pardon me, arrived at the address and was unknown by the parties that lived there?

Postmaster:

It wouldn’t necessarily arrive at the particular address. It would arrive at the office, and if unidentified by the carrier at the time, because the address was incomplete, as last I’ve noted, “street” was missing from the address format. There’s avenue. There’s place. There’s street.

Chen:

Do you know if there is a NW 51st place in Ballard?

Postmaster:

In the zip code book there is. The real person that should be...being talked to is the Ballard manager not me, because I don’t know Ballard’s delivery procedures. I know that when we get a piece of mail here, we do everything we can to get it delivered. However 98107 is a valid zip for the Seattle area.

Chen:

Just a question again about “undeliverable”. So it might have been undeliverable because the post office did not get the name of the address? Is that a possibility?

Postmaster:

That would have been a carrier decision. The piece of mail would have gotten to the delivery station based on the zip code. Because northwest 51st is 98107 in the Seattle zip code book. There’s only one northwest 51st street with the zip code, and that was the zip code on the piece of mail that Mr. De Young had me review. However, once again, “street” was missing from the address line

Chen:

Um, Mr. Rosenow, I rent and I have been living at my address for some months. If I were to receive mail to..to the... directed to the previous tenant and somehow got to me, and I were to write “not known at this address” would that also be considered undeliverable?

Postmaster:

Ah yeah, and the piece would be returned to the sender if it was first class.

Chen:

Thank you very much.

De Young:

Mr. Rosenow, you said about carrier decision. Is there anything different that a carrier would write on a letter that they felt was undeliverable than what a person of the general public might write?

Postmaster:

Uh, no, because when they sort their kickback mail, or we call it the returned mail it’s sorted by different categories. There’s “No Such Number,” “Undeliverable,” “Addressee Unknown,” It depends on what slot the carrier threw it into. And I would have no idea what separation the carrier chose.

De Young:

I understand. So what you’re saying is that there is no way to tell then whether something got kicked back because it was misaddressed and detained at the carrier station or whether it actually reach the house. Is that correct?

Postmaster:

That’s correct.

De Young:

Nothing further.

Judge:

Well, in the State of Washington the court’s limited jurisdiction. There are two ways matters get started. Number one is the citation. Number two is a complaint generated by the prosecutor’s office. The Ewing error I don’t thing was misleading because Mr. Riggin was named as the defendant. I don’t know anything about Mr. Ewing apparently there is same relationship between them. However, before Mr. Riggin had allegedly seen that complaint it was amended to correct that error. So, I can’t see where there would be any prejudice to him because at that point in time he didn’t even know that there was such an error or allegedly didn’t know that there was such an error or allegedly didn’t know that there was an error. As to the local rules, all amendments are to be done by the pre-trial date. It’s not uncommon that amendments are done prior to that so there is no error there. Also in 2.1 as to the complaints the prosecutors office is to use all known information and it refers to the Department of Licensing first. The State criminal record ID number, criminal process number, JUVIS, and DOC. After our last hearing because Mr. Riggin made a point of it. Reviewing the file I saw how the Sheriff’s office had checked for address. The prosecutor’s office had checked for address. I ran and checked for address and even as of last week Mr. Riggin’s address in the our DISCIS system is the Ballard address. So, I think that the prosecutor’s office complied with what they were supposed to. Now, what happens when a summons is sent out and comes back. Well, what happens is an arrest warrant is issued and that is what happened here. When Mr. Riggin became aware of that warrant he was brought in for the arraignment and the arraignment was timely and we’re still proceeding on a timely track. To move to the issue of the recognition of the tribes the only site I found in both the briefs was RCW 37.12.070 where between states you give full faith and credit and between nations there comity, treaty, but there’s been no citation to anything such as that. All I know is 2.48.170. The statute in question says that if you’re a member in good standing from another association you can apply for admission or temporary admission under the admission to practice rules 5E, 8 or 18. And 2.48 makes that an affirmative defense to any claim of unauthorized practice of law. The... as to the Knapstad Motion itself I have to take those inferences most favorable to the state. There is inferences from the conversations. Certainly can be rebutted by the defendant’s testimony. I don’t know, but taking those inferences most favorable to the state it could be found that he was a non-lawyer who did hold himself out as entitled to practice law in the State of Washington and against subject to the affirmative defense of the Admission to Practice rules. So, defendants motion are denied.